Re: Re: A very useful reminder of ourpast mistakes
There was still a strongly nationalistic strain in Vietnam that was in
reaction to the French ( here that? FRENCH? ) colonial powers. We were
somewhat blind on our policies in SE Asia, and we created a self-fulfilling
policy of Communist takeover there, I believe.
In any case, I hope we are learning. Iraq is truly a real test.
Good luck with your book John !
Lenny
P.S Sorry Joya, but I had to include at least a PART of what I was
responding to here, but I cut out David's origiinal post,
L
----- Original Message -----
My husband is writing a book that is largely about Vietnam
(and Cambodia, to some degree). I sent him the Slate URL,
and got this back. Rather than paraphrase it, I'm going to
paste it in here.
* * * * * beginning of John's feedback * * * * *
A few random thoughts on the Slate article:
It's important to remember that South Vietnam did not
fall to an internal rebellion of disaffected southerners.
It fell to an external invasion by a North Vietnamese army
armed with Soviet tanks and heavy artillery. In the subsequent
victory parade, no Viet Cong units were included. All leadership
positions in the "liberated" South went to North Vietnamese. In
fact, no non-communist "nationalists" ever ran anything, and most
ended up in re-education camps (or Orange County) alongside former
South Vietnamese officers.
Comparing Southeast Asian hill tribes to the Kurds is specious
and dismissing them all as mercenaries belittles their considerable
sacrifices, particularly the Hmong in Laos. The Vietnamese invaded
their land and they fought for years with our help to expel them.
Our withdrawal left the Hmong at the mercy of the enemy. Many
thousands were slaughtered.
Overall, while the government of South Vietnam was not especially
loved or respected, it commanded a passive allegiance that the
communists were only able to overcome < once America left < with
superior military force.
Even now, many Northern veterans are bitter over all their
friends who died to build a nation of collectivized agriculture
and secret police trained by East Germans.
* * * * * end of John's feedback * * * * *
I just don't happen to see a lot of really good analogies to
be made, here. If anything, I think Afghanistan (that is,
after the Soviet war) taught us that our intrinsic loathing
of "nation building" can cause us to leave a place too soon,
without proper political/physical infrastructure intact.
And certainly Iran taught us that a purely pragmatic approach
--an amoral one--to foreign policy betrays short-term thinking.
I do think we're learning.
--J
>
Received on 2003-04-25 17:30:59
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